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1 Introduction
While the subtitle “A History of Truth” is far too ambitious for this brief slice through the history
of selected topics in deductive thought, this project does oﬀer, in the words of the pioneers, a few
passages that explain how modern mathematics has arrived at an understanding of elementary
propositional logic. Diﬀerent cultures have held diﬀering views about deduction, i.e. whether a
conclusion can be drawn from certain given information, and whether the conclusion is absolute or
relative. Consider the following two examples of conditional propositions, each phrased in terms of
the words “if ... , then ... :”
1. If a warrior is born at the rising of the Dog Star, then that warrior will not die at sea.
2. If n is an odd integer, then (n2 − 1)/4 is an even integer.
The ﬁrst was hypothesized by the ancient Greeks, while the second is a statement from modern
mathematics. Both are examples of what today are called “implications” (“if-then” statements),
although the ﬁrst is of a speculative nature, useful for its predictive power, and the second is rather
rigid. Given an odd integer n, then either (n2−1)/4 is an even integer or not, decidable immediately
without speculation about future events. The ancient Greeks likely held a more ﬂuid view of logic
than we do today.
Presented in this project are a few excerpts from the works of some of the most inﬂuential
philosophers, mathematicians and logicians over two millennia who have contributed to the modern
interpretation of the truth of an implication. In this abbreviated account, justice can not be done to
the various nuanced intellectual and cultural settings in which each author was writing. However,
the reader may glean a more balanced and comprehensive overview of deductive thought than that
oﬀered by a purely formulaic treatment found in many textbooks.
The project opens with a brief passage from the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322
b.c.e), whose work in philosophy, politics, logic and the natural sciences has survived until today.
Of importance here is a term, often translated as a “syllogism,” which according to Aristotle “is
speech in which, certain things having been supposed, something diﬀerent from those supposed
results of necessity because of their being so” [1, p. 66] [28]. In the sequel, “syllogism” will denote
any rule of reasoning, without restriction to a particular form. The types of syllogisms used by
Aristotle often apply to categories of objects, such as the following: All humans are mortal. All
∗Mathematical Sciences; Dept. 3MB, Box 30001; New Mexico State University; Las Cruces, NM 88003;
jlodder@nmsu.edu.
1mortals will die. Therefore, all humans will die. Aristotle’s logic, however, appears not to have
been used by Greek mathematicians in antiquity, who opted for other rules of deduction.
The particular syllogisms forming the core of the project are those attributed to the lesser-
known Greek philosopher Chrysippus (280–206 b.c.e.), whose work in logic rivaled that of Aristotle.
Presented are ﬁve rules of inference, called indemonstrable argument forms, which involve the terms
“and,” “or,” “not,” and “if-then.” Since no known complete work of Chrysippus remains today, we
must rely on fragments, collected by secondary authors. A central plot line of the project, moving
well beyond the work of those in antiquity, is whether these ﬁve rules attributed to Chrysippus
are special cases of just one rule, and, if not, which rules are logically the same. Verbal argument
asserting the equivalence of certain rules is diﬃcult, and a more streamlined method for discussing
their relation to each other is sought. At the end of the project in Exercises (8.10), (8.11), and
(8.12), the logical equivalence of these argument forms is examined in detail.
In the modern era, an initial attempt at a symbolic and almost calculational form of elementary
logic is examined from the work of the English mathematician George Boole (1815–1864). Author of
An Investigation of the Laws of Thought [5], Boole believed that he had reduced deductive thought
to a system of calculation involving the signs ×, +, −, borrowed from arithmetic. Quoted here
are only a few brief passages from Boole’s monumental treatise [5, 6], designed to introduce the
reader to how statements involving terms like “and,” “or,” and “not” could even be written using
the ×, +, − notation. What verbal meanings do these symbols actually capture? Do the symbols
retain their algebraic meaning, or are they subject to non-algebraic rules, since they express “the
laws of thought”? An important outgrowth of Boole’s “algebra of statements” is the convention of
assigning true statements the value 1, and false statements the value 0.
The German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) introduced a radically
new system of notation for logic, called a concept-script or “Begriﬀsschrift” in the original German,
which did not use Boole’s ×, +, − notation. Within the concept-script, Frege [8, 9] uses a special
symbol, called the condition stroke1 that carries a truth value recognized today as being very close
to the “if-then” statements appearing in Chrysippus’s ﬁrst two rules of inference. In fact, the
progression of thought from antiquity to today is quite compelling. The ancient Greek philosopher
Philo of Megara (ca. 4th century b.c.e.) maintained that a valid hypothetical proposition is “that
which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood” [25, II. 110], while Frege maintained
that the symbol B
A
is true except when A is true and B is false, a comparison to be explored in
Exercises (5.9) and (6.2). Again, the intellectual and cultural settings in which these two statements
were written are relevant.
While Frege successfully established a break between statements in mathematics and the logic
needed to manipulate those statements, his notation is a bit awkward. His work is codiﬁed and
greatly expanded in the lucid prose of the English mathematicians and philosophers Bertrand Rus-
sell (1872–1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), who set the stage for mathematical
logic in the twentieth century. Both Englishmen were practitioners of logicism, the belief that
mathematical truths could be deduced from truths in logic. In their magnum opus Principia Math-
ematica [22], a streamlined notation for logic diﬀerent from that of Frege and Boole is introduced.
The condition stroke of Frege is replaced with a more convenient symbol. In fact, all ﬁve rules
attributed to Chrysippus can be succinctly rewritten in the notation of Russell and Whitehead,
an important ﬁrst step in deciding the logical equivalence of these rules. Additionally Russell was
1
2a proliﬁc writer, contributing to the ﬁelds of education, history, religion, and political theory. He
was an advocate of social reform, an anti-war activist, and later in life an anti-nuclear activist. His
anti-war protests in England resulted in his dismissal from Trinity College in 1916, and a ﬁve-month
imprisonment in 1918.
In Principia Mathematica Russell and Whitehead state that the truth-values of statements
involving terms like “and,” “or,” “not” depend only upon the elementary propositions to which
these terms apply. Exactly how is the truth value of a complicated statement determined from its
elementary pieces? One solution to this is oﬀered by the Austrian logician Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889–1951) whose “schemata” provide a simple overview, in tabular format, for the truth of a
complicated (compound) statement. All ﬁve rules attributed to Chrysippus can be written using
these schemata, and then compared among themselves. Wittgenstein introduces the term “truth
grounds” for those values (“true” or “false”) of the elementary propositions that yield the truth of
a compound statement built from its elementary pieces. This he uses to state the conditions under
which an implication (an “if-then” statement) is true, which is applicable to Chrysippus’s ﬁrst two
rules of inference.
Independently of Wittgenstein, Emil Post (1897–1954) developed a nearly identical tabular for-
mat for displaying the truth values of a compound statement, and he dubbed these displays “truth
tables,” the name in current use today. Emil was born in Poland, of Jewish parents, with whom
he emigrated to New York in 1904. He received his doctorate from Columbia University, where he
participated in a seminar devoted to the study of Principia Mathematica. In his dissertation of
1921, “Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions” [19], he develops the notion
of truth tables and clearly displays the table for an implication. With this in hand, a simple analysis
of all ﬁve rules attributed to Chrysippus follows. Sadly, Emil suﬀered from manic depression, a
condition treated by electro-convulsive shock. His death from a sudden heart attack occurred in a
mental institution shortly after one of these treatments [20, p. xii].
Exercise 1.1. In what constellation does the Dog Star appear? By what name is the Dog Star
known today?
Exercise 1.2. For each of the odd integers n = 1, 3, 5, determine whether (n2 − 1)/4 is an even
integer. Can you prove in general that if n is any odd integer, then (n2 − 1)/4 is an even integer?
2 Aristotle Deﬁnes Syllogism
A towering ﬁgure in the history of deductive thought is the ancient Greek philosopher and generalist
Aristotle (384–322 b.c.e.), whose works in logic, government, and natural science have been studied
and revisited ever since their authorship more than two millennia ago. The young Aristotle studied
at Plato’s Academy in Athens until Plato’s death in 347. After this Aristotle tutored Alexander
the Great at the court of Alexander’s father, Philip II of Macedon. Eventually Aristotle returned
to Athens, where he founded his own school, the Lyceum [16, p. 54]. He contributed to virtually
all ﬁelds of knowledge, particularly the sciences, such as biology, physics and astronomy, where his
work as an empiricist (observer and recorder of facts) is preeminent [10]. Let’s turn to his work in
logic, particularly the use of deduction, which may have been an outgrowth of his inquiry into the
scientiﬁc method. Although this project will examine in detail the work of other philosophers, some
more relevant to the type of deductive reasoning presented here, we begin with Aristotle, whose
work was transmitted to the Arabic and Latin medieval arenas, from which it greatly inﬂuenced
European and present-day thought. Aristotle acknowledges the role that language must play in a
3study of logic and limits his consideration to statements that are true or false. A brief excerpt from
his writing On Interpretation [1, p. 42–45] [2] reads:
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a physical faculty is realized,
but, ... by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in
them either truth or falsity. Thus, a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false.
Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentences but the proposition, for this last concerns our
present inquiry ... . Every proposition must contain a verb or the tense of a verb. ...
In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions ... must be true or false.
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Exercise 2.1. Based on Aristotle’s description, which of the following are propositions? Justify
your answer. If you have diﬃculty with a particular item, explain what the diﬃculty is.
(a) Let there be light.
(b) The number three.
(c) A square has ﬁve sides.
(d) Every coyote has four legs.
(e) This sentence is false.
Aristotle begins Prior Analytics with “We must ﬁrst state the subject of our inquiry and the
faculty to which it belongs: its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demon-
strative science” [1, p. 65] [3]. A key tool in the demonstration, i.e., veriﬁcation, of a proposition
is what has become known as a syllogism. “A deduction [syllogism] is speech in which, certain
things having been supposed, something diﬀerent from those supposed results of necessity because
of their being so” [1, p. 66] [28]. Aristotle discusses several types of syllogisms or rules of inference,
beginning with the “ﬁrst ﬁgure” of term arrangements: “If A is predicated of all B, and B of all
C, A must be predicated of all C” [1, p. 68]. We will call this “Aristotle’s ﬁrst ﬁgure,” while A,
B and C are called terms. A property or quality A predicated of all B means that every B has
property A, or every B is an A. Let’s examine the use of this syllogism.
Exercise 2.2. Identify the terms A, B and C in the ﬁrst ﬁgure for the statement: “Having four
sides is predicated of every rectangle, and being a rectangle is predicated of every square.” What
conclusion can be drawn from these premises? How can the statement “A is predicated of every B”
be written more directly beginning with “Every B ... ”? How can “B is predicated of every C” be
written more directly beginning with “Every C ... ”? Find a more direct statement (in the active
voice) of Aristotle’s ﬁrst ﬁgure using these simpliﬁcations. Rewrite “Having four sides is predicated
of every rectangle, and being a rectangle is predicated of every square” using this reformulation.
Exercise 2.3. Let A, B and C be terms in the sense of Aristotle. Consider the statements:
(I) If C occurs, then B occurs; and if B occurs, then A occurs.
(II) If C occurs, then A occurs.
Would you claim that (II) is a logical inference from (I)? If so, support your position using the
work of Aristotle. If not, ﬁnd a counter example. Would you claim that (I) is a logical inference
from (II)? If so, support your position using the work of Aristotle. If not, ﬁnd a counter example.
43 Chrysippus and Five Indemonstrable Forms
While studied extensively, Aristotle’s term logic appears not to have been used by ancient Greek
mathematicians [16, p. 55], including Euclid. How would the reader prove the statement “the base
angles of an isosceles triangle are congruent” by concatenation of terms? A rival logic to that of
Aristotle arose in the Hellenistic period (ca. late third century through the ﬁrst century b.c.e),
namely that of the Stoic philosophers, who maintained that enlightenment arose from emotionally
detached judgments. During its time, Stoic logic was held in higher regard than Aristotle’s logic
[28], although no known complete works of the Stoics survive today, with only fragments remaining.
Chief among the Stoics was Chrysippus (ca. 280–206 b.c.e.) of whom Diogenes Laertius some 500
years later wrote “So renowned was he [Chrysippus] for dialectic that most people thought, if the
gods took to dialectic, they would adopt no other system than that of Chrysippus” [7, p. 289].
Writing in Greek, the commentator Diogenes Laertius (ca. third century c.e.) continues [7, p. 187]
Further, arguments may be divided into true and false. The former draw their conclu-
sions by means of true premisses ... . Those are false which have error in the premisses
or are inconclusive ... . Further, there are statements which are indemonstrable, be-
cause they do not need demonstration; they are employed in the construction of every
argument. As to the number of these, authorities diﬀer; Chrysippus makes them ﬁve.
Let’s examine ﬁve argument forms attributed to Chrysippus, although other forms were in use.
Since his works are no longer extant, we must rely on fragments collected by secondary authors [7,
p. 189] [13, p. 83] [17, p. 212–213].
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
1. If the ﬁrst, [then] the second. The ﬁrst. Therefore, the second.
2. If the ﬁrst, [then] the second. Not the second. Therefore, not the ﬁrst.
3. Not both the ﬁrst and the second. The ﬁrst. Therefore, not the second.
4. Either the ﬁrst or the second. The ﬁrst. Therefore, not the second.
5. Either the ﬁrst or the second. Not the ﬁrst. Therefore, the second.
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Examples of these rules of inference abound, but let’s consider those given in Diogenes Laertius
and by others in antiquity [13, p. 84]. Note that (curiously) no example of the fourth rule is
provided in these fragments.
1. If it is day, there is light. It is day. Therefore, there is light.
2. If it is day, there is light. There is not light. Therefore, it is not day.
3. It is not the case both that it is day and it is night. It is day. Therefore, it is not night.
5. Either it is day or it is night. It is not night. Therefore, it is day.2
2In this example, the ﬁrst and second are switched from the general rule above.
5In each of the syllogisms above, a conclusion is being drawn from two given statements, the
ﬁrst a more general statement, e.g., “Either it is day or it is night,” and the second a more speciﬁc
statement, e.g., “It is not night,” with the conclusion in this case being “It is day.” The ﬁrst, more
general statement, is often called the major premise, while the second, more speciﬁc statement,
is called the minor premise. The ﬁve rules of inference (syllogisms) above all begin with a major
premise, followed by a minor premise and a conclusion. The major premises of the ﬁrst two rules are
examples of “if-then” statements, also commonly called “hypothetical propositions” in translation
from ancient Greek [26, II. 111-113]. The truth of a hypothetical proposition itself was a matter of
debate in antiquity [12]. Within the structure of an “if-then” statement, the “if” clause is called the
antecedent, while the “then” clause is called the consequent. The Greek physician, philosopher, and
commentator Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160–210 c.e.) states [26, II. 112]: “Now all the Dialecticians
agree in asserting that a hypothetical proposition is valid when its consequent follows [from] its
antecedent, but as to when and how it so follows they disagree with one another, and propound
conﬂicting criteria of this ‘following.’ ” Another philosopher of antiquity, Philo of Megara, (ca.
4th century b.c.e.) maintained that a valid hypothetical proposition is “that which does not begin
with a truth and end with a falsehood” [25, II. 110], a statement studied further in Exercise 5.9.
An issue in understanding these passages may be in the translation and interpretation of ancient
Greek, while another problem lies in a confusion between modern and ancient meanings of terms
like “hypothetical proposition,” “antecedent,” and “consequent.”
Let’s move to the other indemonstrable forms, and examine their major premises. The third
has as major premise “Not both the ﬁrst and the second,” while the fourth and ﬁfth rules both
begin with “Either the ﬁrst or the second.” Could a major premise involving an “and” statement
be logically the same as a major premise involving an “or” statement? Are the two major premises
involving “or” actually equivalent? Why are two rules stated for the use of “or”?
Exercise 3.1. Although we cannot be certain of the logical import of the connective “or” as used
by Diogenes Laertius in the interpretation of Chrysippus, consider two common uses of “or” in
language today:
(I) For $7.95 the meal comes with either soup or salad.
(II) As a graduation requirement in science, a student must pass either a physics course or a
chemistry course.
(a) In statement (I) is the conclusion valid, namely that the meal costs $7.95, if both
conditions of the “or” statement are met, i.e., both soup and salad are ordered?
(b) In statement (II) is the conclusion valid, namely that a student fulﬁlls a graduation
requirement in science, if both conditions of the “or” statement are met, namely
the student passes both a course in physics and a course in chemistry?
(c) Today we say that the statement “A or B” represents the exclusive or if the truth
of “A or B” excludes the possibility that both A and B are true. Similarly, “A or
B” represents the inclusive or if the truth of “A or B” includes the possibility that
both A and B are true. In the fourth rule of inference, Chrysippus states “Either
the ﬁrst or the second. The ﬁrst. Therefore, not the second.” Must the conclusion
“Therefore not the second” necessarily follow for the “inclusive or”? the “exclusive
or”? Explain your answer with a concrete example, providing actual statements
for “the ﬁrst” and “the second.”
6(d) Consider the following example of Chrysippus’s ﬁfth rule of inference: “Either it
is foggy or it is cold. It is not cold. Therefore, it is foggy.” Is a particular type of
“or” being used? Must the conclusion “Therefore, it is foggy” necessarily follow
for the “inclusive or”? for the “exclusive or”? Justify your answer.
(e) When Aristotle states that a proposition is either true or false, what type of “or”
is being used?
Exercise 3.2. (a) The major premise of the ﬁrst rule of inference is an example of an “if-then”
statement. Consider the statement: “If the roof leaks, then the house will not sell.” Using
the second rule of inference, what can be concluded if the house will sell? Write this as an
“if-then” statement beginning with “If the house will sell, ... .”
(b) Now letting A and B denote general propositions, rewrite “If A, then B” as a diﬀerent
“if-then” statement that generalizes the example in part (a).
Exercise 3.3. (a) The major premise of the third rule of inference is the negation (not the case)
of an “and” statement. Rewrite “It is not the case both that it is day and it is night” as
an “if-then” statement so that when the pattern of the ﬁrst rule of inference is followed, the
minor premise becomes “It is day,” and the conclusion matches that in the example for the
third rule of inference.
(b) Now, for elementary propositions A and B, rewrite “It is not the case that both A and B”
as an “if-then” statement following the example in part (a).
Exercise 3.4. The major premise of the fourth rule of inference is an “exclusive or” statement.
Suppose that “either A or B, but not both” is given and that A is true. What can be concluded
about B? Justify your answer.
Exercise 3.5. For the inclusive or, write “either A or B” as an “if-then” statement following the
pattern of the ﬁfth rule of inference.
Exercise 3.6. Speculate on whether every “if-then” statement can be written as an “and” state-
ment. Speculate on whether every “if-then” statement can be written as an “exclusive or” state-
ment, or as an “inclusive or” statement. Apply your conjectures to the statement “if the roof
leaks, then the house will not sell.” At the end of the project in Exercise 8.8 we will return to this
question.
4 Boole’s Algebra of Statements
An old point of view on logic is to reduce the subject to a system of calculation, whereby the
rules of reasoning could be automated. The German philosopher, mathematician, and universalist
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was one of the ﬁrst to pursue this idea, and sought a
characteristica generalis (general characteristic) or a lingua generalis (general language) that would
serve as a universal symbolic language and reduce all debate to calculation. Leibniz maintained “If
controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation between two philosophers
than between two accountants. For it would suﬃce to take their pencils in their hands, to sit
down to their slates, and to say to each other: ... Let us calculate” [23, p. 170]. What form
should a universal language assume? What system of calculation is best suited for computations
in reasoning? The solution to such a query is framed by existing systems of calculations.
7The self-taught English mathematician George Boole (1815–1864) begins his 1854 opus An
Investigation of the Laws of Thought [5] with “The design of the following treatise is to investigate
the fundamental laws of those operations of the mind by which reasoning is performed; to give
expression to them in the symbolical language of a calculus3, and upon this foundation to establish
the science of Logic and construct its method” [6, p. 1]. The symbols chosen by Boole to represent
the fundamental laws of reasoning are borrowed from algebra, namely ×, +, −, although their
meaning is not in an algebraic sense, but a logical one. Boole actually believed that he had captured
“the laws of thought,” and a detailed study of his treatise [6] reveals the extensive calculational
scope of his methods. Presented here are only a few passages designed to indicate how terms like
“and,” “or,” “except” are rewritten using the symbols ×, +, −. Boole’s use of “or” is in the
exclusive sense, but in the exercises, “or” is often inclusive. Although at the time the work was not
applied to the design of automated calculating machines, today the ideas introduced in The Laws
of Thought are seen as fundamental to the construction of certain circuits in digital computers,
and a “Boolean variable” is one which assumes only one of two possible values, 1 or 0, “true” or
“false.” For further material on this topic, see Janet Barnett’s Loci: Convergence articles “Origins
of Boolean Algebra in the Logic of Classes,” “Boolean Algebra as an Abstract Structure,” and
“Applications of Boolean Algebra,” published on-line in this series.
Boole was originally a school teacher, but in 1849 was appointed as a founding Professor of
Mathematics at Queen’s College in Cork, Ireland. Apparently he was unaware of Leibniz’s goal to
ﬁnd a universal symbolic language as The Laws of Thought was in press [11, p. 51]. Let’s read a
few excerpts from this treatise. [6, p. 27–48].
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Proposition I.
All the operations of Language, as an instrument of reasoning, may be conducted by a system of
signs composed of the following elements, viz:
1st. Literal symbols, as x, y &c.4, representing things as subjects of our conceptions.
2nd. Signs of operation, as +, −, ×, standing for those operations of the mind by which the
conceptions of things are combined or resolved so as to form new conceptions involving the elements.
3rd. The sign of identity, =.
And these symbols of Logic are in their use subject to deﬁnite laws, partly agreeing with and partly
diﬀering from the laws of the corresponding symbols in the science of Algebra.
Let it be assumed as a criterion of the true elements of rational discourse, that they should be
susceptible of combination in the simplest forms and by the simplest laws, and thus combining should
generate all other known and conceivable forms of language; and adopting this principle, let the following
classiﬁcation be considered.
class I.
Appellative or descriptive signs, expressing either the name of a thing or some quality or circumstance
belonging to it.
To this class we may obviously refer the substantive5 proper or common, and the adjective. ...
Let us then agree to represent the class of individuals to which a particular name or description
is applicable, by a single letter, as x. ... By a class is usually meant a collection of individuals, to
3a system of calculation
4The symbol “&c.” is old English for “etcetera,” abbreviated today as “etc.”
5noun
8each of which a particular name or description may be applied; but in this work the meaning of the
term will be extended so as to include the case in which but a single individual exists, answering to
the required name or description, as well as the cases denoted by the terms “nothing” and “universe,”
which as “classes” should be understood to comprise respectively “no beings,” and “all beings.” ...
Let it further be agreed, that by the combination xy shall be represented that class of things to which
the names or descriptions represented by x and y are simultaneously applicable. ...
[I]f x represent “estuaries,” and y “rivers,” the expressions xy and yx will indiﬀerently represent
“rivers that are estuaries,” or “estuaries that are rivers,” ... . Let there be a third symbol, as z,
representing that class of things to which the term “navigable” is applicable, and any one of the
following expressions,
zxy, zyx, xyz, &c.,
will represent the class of “navigable rivers that are estuaries.” ...
As the combination of two literal symbols in the form xy expresses the whole of that class of objects
to which the names or qualities represented by x and y are together applicable, it follows that if the
two symbols have exactly the same signiﬁcation, their combination expresses no more than either of the
symbols taken alone would do. In such case we should therefore have
xy = x.
As y is, however, supposed to have the same meaning as x, we may replace it in the above equation by
x, and we thus get
xx = x.
... . [T]he above equation assumes the form
x2 = x,
...
We pass now to the consideration of another class of the signs of speech, and of the laws connected
with their use.
class II.
Signs of those mental operations whereby we collect parts into a whole, or separate a whole into its
parts.
We ... are ... capable of ... forming the aggregate conception of a group of objects consisting of
partial groups, each of which is separately named or described. For this purpose we use the conjunctions
“and,” “or,” &c. “Trees and minerals,” “barren mountains, or fertile vales,” are examples of this kind.
In strictness, the words “and,” “or,” interposed between the terms descriptive of two or more classes of
objects, imply that those classes are quite distinct, so that no member of one is found in another. In
this and in all other respects the words “and”6 “or” are analogous with the sign + in algebra, and their
laws identical. Thus the expression “men and women” is, conventional meanings set aside, equivalent
with the expression “women and men.” Let x represent “men,” y, “women;” and let + stand for “and”
and “or,” then we have
x + y = y + x,
an equation which would equally hold true if x and y represented numbers, and + were the sign of
arithmetical addition. ...
6Here “and” is probably meant in a collective sense.
9[W]e cannot conceive it possible to collect parts into a whole, and not conceive it also possible to
separate a part from the whole. This operation we express in common language by the sign except, ...
. As we have expressed the operation of aggregation by the sign +, so we may express the negative
operation above described by − sign. Thus if x be taken to represent men, and y, Asiatics, i.e. Asiatic
men, then the concept of “All men except Asiatics” will be expressed by x − y. ...
We have seen that the symbols of Logic are subject to the special law,
x2 = x.
Now of the symbols of Number there are but two, viz. 0 and 1, which are subject to the same formal
law. We know that 02 = 0, and that 12 = 1; and the equation x2 = x, considered as algebraic, has no
other roots than 0 and 1. ... Let us conceive, then, of an Algebra in which the symbols x, y, z, &c.
admit indiﬀerently of the values 0 and 1, and of these values alone. ...
[T]he respective interpretations of the symbols 0 and 1 in the system of Logic are Nothing and
Universe. ...
If x represent any class of objects, then will 1 − x represent the contrary or supplementary class of
objects, i.e. the class including all objects which are not comprehended in the class x.
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
We ﬁrst examine Boole’s use of the symbols 0 and 1. On one hand, these symbols carry their
numerical connotation from “Let us conceive, then, of an Algebra in which the symbols x, y, z
admit ... the values of 0 and 1.” On the other hand, 0 and 1 have “interpretations ... in the system
of Logic” as “Nothing” and “Universe.” In this project, we will work with both versions, although
for computations “literal symbols ... representing things” must have “the values 0 and 1, and of
these values alone.”
Exercise 4.1. If x represents “mountains,” y “valleys,” z “things rich in minerals,” and w repre-
sents “things rich in vegetation,” how would each of the following be represented using the symbols
x, y, z, w, and the signs ×, +, −. Justify your answer in each case. Note that xy denotes the
product x×y. Also, throughout the exercise consider “or” as inclusive, although in some examples
there may be no object that satisﬁes both conditions of the “or” statement. Use parentheses where
appropriate.
(a) mountains or valleys;
(b) mountains rich in minerals or valleys rich in minerals;
(c) mountains or valleys, with the additional condition that the formation is rich in minerals;
(d) mountains rich in vegetation, but not mountains rich in minerals;
(e) mountains, having the property of being rich in vegetation but not rich in minerals;
(f) the class of objects that are not mountains. Hint: How does Boole represent “the contrary
or supplementary class of objects”?
(g) the class of objects that are both rich in minerals and rich in vegetation;
(h) the class of objects that are not both rich in minerals and rich in vegetation;
(i) the class of objects that are either not rich in minerals or not rich in vegetation;
10(j) the class of objects that are either rich in minerals or rich in vegetation, but not both.
(k) Boole states that “these symbols of Logic are in their use subject to deﬁnite laws, partly
agreeing with ... the laws of the corresponding symbols in the science of Algebra.” What law
of symbolic logic can be concluded from parts (b) and (c) above? Justify your answer. From
parts (d) and (e)? Justify your answer.
(ℓ) What law of symbolic logic can be concluded from parts (h) and (i)? How does this compare
to the algebraic meaning of this “equation”? Recall that Boole also states that the symbols
of logic partly diﬀer from their algebraic use.
Exercise 4.2. Letting x and y denote arbitrary “literal symbols” in the sense of Boole, we interpret
x = 1 as meaning that condition x or property x is “true,” while x = 0 means that condition x is
“false.” We adopt Boole’s notation that xy denotes the condition that both x and y are “true”.
Let’s compare the logical meaning of “and” with the algebraic law of multiplication. To separate
logic from algebra for the moment, use either true, “T,” or false, “F,” when considering a statement
in logic. First suppose that x is either true or false, and y is either true or false. Fill in the following
table for truth of “x and y,” depending on the truth values of x and y individually.
T
F
F T @
@ x
y
Truth of “x and y.”
Now compare this to the standard (base 10) multiplication table for xy when x has the values
0 or 1, and y has the values of 0 or 1.
1
0
0 1 @
@ x
y
Multiplication Table for x · y.
Do the logical values for “x and y” match the multiplication table for xy with T = 1 and F = 0?
Using the “inclusive or,” ﬁll in the following table for the truth of “x or y,” depending on the
individual truth values of x and y.
T
F
F T @
@ x
y
Truth of “inclusive or.”
Now compare this to the standard (base 10) addition table for x + y, where x has the values 0 or
1, and y has the values of 0 or 1.
111
0
0 1 @
@ x
y
Addition Table for x + y.
Do the logical values for “x or y” match the addition table for x + y with T = 1 and F = 0?
We will continue using x + y to denote the “inclusive or,” noting that if x is true and y is true,
then x+y is true. Keep in mind that Boole states “these symbols of Logic are in their use subject
to deﬁnite laws, ... partly diﬀering from the corresponding symbols in the science of Algebra.”
Exercise 4.3. Recall that Chrysippus uses the negation of an “and” statement as one of his major
premises. Letting x and y denote literal symbols in the sense of Boole, what construction in
Boole’s system represents the class of objects that do not satisfy both conditions x and y? Fill in
the following table for this new construction, using 1s and 0s.
1
0
0 1 @
@ x
y
Not both x and y.
What construction in Boole’s system represents the class of objects that either do not satisfy
condition x or do not satisfy condition y? Fill in the following table for this construction, using 1s
and 0s.
1
0
0 1 @
@ x
y
Either not x or not y.
Compare the tables for “not both x and y” with “either not x or not y.” Can the negation of
every “and” statement be written as an “inclusive or” statement?
Exercise 4.4. The use of “+” to denote the “inclusive or” for the statement “A or B” leads to
the rule of logic 1 + 1 = 1. Interpret this in terms of the meaning of “A or B” when both A and
B are true. What advantages does it aﬀord to logic? What disadvantages? Apply your discussion
to the rule
1 − xy = (1 − x) + (1 − y).
Comment on the usefulness of using “+” to denote “or,” and “−” to denote negation.
5 Frege Invents A Concept-Script
An important contribution of George Boole is the reduction of certain statements in logic to a system
of calculation using symbols in place of the words “and,” “or,” and “not,” whereby complicated
expressions can be manipulated algebraically. Boole borrowed symbols in common use from “the
12science of Algebra,” namely ×, +, −, although in many cases the rules of algebra do not correspond
to the rules of logic. Nonetheless, these symbols can then be used to express the major premise
for the last three rules of inference stated by Chrysippus that involve the expressions “and,” “or,”
“not.” What about Chrysippus’s ﬁrst two rules of inference that involve a syllogism in the form of
an “if-then” statement? Of Aristotelian logic itself, Boole questions “whether syllogism is indeed the
fundamental type of reasoning” [6, p. 238], and concludes: “It cannot be conceived that syllogism
should be the one essential process of reasoning, and yet the manifestation of that process present
nothing indicative of this high quality of pre-eminence” [6, p. 239]. Boole does not introduce a
special symbol for a syllogism, presumedly since the conclusions drawn therefrom can be achieved
by other statements involving “and,” “or,” “not.”
Let’s now turn to the work of the German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848–
1925) who sought a logical basis, not for language as Boole, but for arithmetic and mathematical
analysis [11, p. 177]. Frege maintained that arithmetic propositions, such as 2 + 2 = 4, should
follow from expressions of truth in pure logic. Like the stoic philosophers of ancient Greece, Frege
believed in an objective basis of thought. Unlike Boole, he used symbols showing no kinship with
either arithmetic or algebra, and placed special emphasis on the concept of deduction.
Let’s study more closely Frege’s own particular notation, which he called a concept-script, or
“Begriﬀsschrift” in the original German. Greek letters, such as ξ, ζ, ∆, Γ represent propositions,
such as statements in arithmetic, and belong to either the True or the False. A horizontal line
— denotes a “judgment stroke” that renders the value of either true or false when applied to a
proposition. For example, — 22 = 5 returns the value “false,” while — 22 = 4 returns “true.” The
symbol ξ denotes the negation of — ξ, while ζ denotes that ζ is a true statement. These symbols
may be combined in what Frege calls “amalgamation of horizontals,” so that ( ∆) becomes ∆,
meaning that the negation of ∆ is true, i.e., ∆ itself is false. Quoted below are only a few passages
from The Basic Laws of Arithmetic [9], without mention of Frege’s extensive work on quantiﬁed
statements (today called “predicate logic.”)
Exercise 5.1. (a) Evaluate the following symbols in Frege’s concept script as either true or false.
Brieﬂy justify your answer.
(i) — 2 + 2 = 5.
(ii) 2 + 2 = 5.
(b) Is 2 + 2 = 5 a correct statement? Is 2 + 2 = 4 a correct statement? Justify your answers.
Frege does not introduce special symbols for either “and” or “or,” but instead, in a highly
original move, oﬀers the world of logic an entirely new symbol, denoted
ξ
ζ
called the condition-stroke [8, p. 20] [9, p. 51], which supersedes concepts like “and” and “or.” To
ease the transition to Frege’s paper, the reader may wish to replace ζ with the letter A and ξ with
the letter B, and examine the conditions under which
B
A
13is true. Recall that Philo of Megara maintained that a valid hypothetical proposition is “that which
does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood” [25, II. 110]. Using A as the beginning
statement and B as the ending statement, we see that the entire symbol B
A
is itself true as long
as it does not begin with a true statement (A) and end with a false statement (B).
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
§12. Condition-stroke, And, Neither-nor,
Subcomponents, Main Component.
In order to enable us to designate the subordination of a concept under a concept, and other
important relations, I introduce the function of two arguments
ξ
ζ
by stipulating that its value shall be the False if the True be taken as ζ-argument and any object other
than the True be taken as ξ-argument, and that in all other cases, the value of the function shall be the
True. ... The vertical stroke I call the condition-stroke. It may be lengthened as required.
The following propositions hold:
“ 32 > 2
3 > 2,
” “ 22 > 2
2 > 2,
” “ 12 > 2
1 > 2.
”
The function ξ
ζ
or ξ
ζ
has as value always the True if the function ξ
ζ
has value the False, and
conversely. Therefore, Γ
∆
is the True if and only if ∆ is the True and Γ is not the True. Consequently
2 > 3
2 + 3 = 5.
In words: 2 is not greater than 3 and the sum of 2 and 3 is 5.
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Exercise 5.2. (a) To understand the condition-stroke, ﬁrst review when ξ
ζ
is true. Of the four
possible combinations of ξ and ζ being true or false, how many of them result in the truth of
ξ
ζ
? Which ones? Given ξ
ζ
, i.e., that ξ
ζ
is true, and given ζ, (— ζ is true), what can be
concluded about — ξ? Why? Given Γ
∆
and ∆, i.e., — ∆ is false, what can be concluded
about — Γ? Justify your answer.
14(b) Now explain why the statement 32 > 2
3 > 2
is correct. What statement does ξ represent in this
case? What is the value of — ξ? What does ζ represent here? What is the value of — ζ?
Explain why 22 > 2
2 > 2
is valid using new statements for ξ and ζ in this case. Explain why
12 > 2
1 > 2
is correct using the statements for ξ and ζ in this further case.
Exercise 5.3. (a) Of the four possible combinations of ξ and ζ being true or false, how many
of them result in the truth of ξ
ζ
, i.e., the negation of ξ
ζ
? Which ones? How does this
compare to the truth values of the statement “ξ and ζ”? Hint: Review Exercise 4.2 in the
Boole section.
(b) Use the symbols and in some combination to ﬁnd a Frege statement that matches the
truth values for “ξ and ζ.” Justify your answer.
Exercise 5.4. Use the symbols and in some combination to ﬁnd a construction that matches
the truth values for “ξ or ζ” for the “inclusive or.” Comment on why Frege may not have introduced
separate symbols for “and” and “or.”
Let’s read further from Frege [8, p. 25–26] [9, p. 57–59] and compare this to Chrysippus’s
indemonstrable argument forms.
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
§14. First Method of Inference.
From the propositions “ Γ
∆
” and “ ∆,” we may infer “ Γ.” For if Γ were not the True, then since
∆ is the True, Γ
∆
would be the False. ...
§15. Second Method of Inference. Contraposition.
We have that ∆
Γ
is the False if Γ is the True and ∆ is not the True; i.e., if — Γ is the False
and ∆ [— ∆] is the True. In all other cases ∆
Γ
is the True. But the same holds for Γ
∆
; thus the
functions ζ
ξ
and ξ
ζ
always have the same value for the same arguments. ... Thus we may pass from
the proposition Γ
∆
to the proposition ∆
Γ
and conversely. ...
A subcomponent [ζ] may be interchanged with the main component [ξ] if the truth-value of each is
simultaneously reversed. This transition we call contraposition [Wendung].
15∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Exercise 5.5. Rewrite Chrysippus’s ﬁrst rule of inference “If the ﬁrst, then the second; the ﬁrst;
therefore the second” entirely in Frege’s notation. Identify two propositions ξ, ζ in the major
premise “If the ﬁrst, then the second,” and ﬁnd a symbol in Frege’s concept-script that expresses
how the ﬁrst is related to the second. Be sure to justify your answer. Write the minor premise “the
ﬁrst [is true]” in Frege’s notation. Write the conclusion “the second [is true]” in Frege’s notation
as well.
Exercise 5.6. Rewrite Chrysippus’s second rule of inference “If the ﬁrst, then the second; but
not the second; therefore not the ﬁrst” entirely in Frege’s notation. Separately write the major
premise, minor premise, and conclusion using his concept-script. Be sure to justify your answer, and
carefully state the meaning of any symbols such as ξ or ζ that you may wish to use. Rewrite “If the
ﬁrst, then the second” as an equivalent “if-then” statement beginning with “If not the second, ...
.” Write this latter “if-then” statement using the condition stroke. How does Chrysippus’s second
rule compare to Frege’s law “A subcomponent may be interchanged with the main component if
the truth-value of each is simultaneously reversed”?
Exercise 5.7. Consider the example of Chrysippus’s third rule of inference: “It is not the case
both that it is day and it is night. It is day. Therefore, it is not night.” Let ζ denote the proposition
“It is day,” and let ξ denote the proposition “It is night.” Write the major premise of the third rule
entirely in Frege’s notation. Write the minor premise and conclusion using his notation as well. Be
sure to justify your answer.
Exercise 5.8. Using the “inclusive or,” rewrite the example of Chrysippus’s ﬁfth rule of inference
“Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night; therefore it is day” entirely in Frege’s notation.
Let ξ denote “It is day,” and let ζ denote “It is night,” as independent symbols. Write the major
premise, minor premise, and conclusion using his concept-script. Be sure to justify your answer
using complete sentences.
Exercise 5.9. Compare and contrast the following two statements. The ﬁrst is attributed to Philo
the Logician (Philo of Megara), and the second was authored by Gottlob Frege:
I. A valid hypothetical proposition is “that which does not begin with a truth and end with a
falsehood” [25, II. 110].
II. “I introduce the function of two arguments ξ
ζ
by stipulating that its value shall be the False if
the True be taken as ζ-argument and any object other than the True be taken as ξ-argument,
and that in all other cases, the value of the function shall be the True” [9, p. 51].
Which of the arguments, ξ or ζ, in Frege’s condition stroke plays the role of the “beginning” of a
hypothetical proposition in Philo’s statement? Which argument plays the role of the “ending” of
a hypothetical proposition?
Exercise 5.10. Has Frege oﬀered an alternative to Boole’s statement “It cannot be conceived that
syllogism [implication] should be the one essential process of reasoning, and yet the manifestation
of that process present nothing indicative of this high quality of pre-eminence” [6, p. 239]? What is
the manifestation of a syllogism [implication] in Frege’s notation, at least in the form of an “if-then”
statement?
166 Russell and Whitehead Find New Notation
While somewhat awkward in execution, Gottlob Frege’s condition stroke 7 is the centerpiece of his
system of logic. The import of this symbol is that of deduction, and advances his philosophy that
mathematical truths should follow from truths in logic, a point of view known today as logicism.
Two later practitioners of logicism whose work set the stage for mathematical logic of the twentieth
century were Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947). The British
mathematician and philosopher A. N. Whitehead began his career at Trinity College in Cambridge,
where he taught from 1885 to 1910 [14]. In 1898 he authored A Treatise on Universal Algebra,
with Applications [29] concerning the foundations of mathematics. Bertrand Russell matriculated
at Trinity as a student in 1890, where Whitehead became his mentor. Russell authored The
Principles of Mathematics [21] in 1903, which also dealt with foundational issues, and soon the
two scholars began a collaboration on what would become their highly inﬂuential magnum opus
Principia Mathematica [22], published in three volumes (1910, 1912, 1913). The work develops the
doctrine of logicism, and seeks to place on ﬁrm foundations emerging ideas in set theory. While
students new to mathematics see little controversy in the basic principles of the subject, Russell
had discovered an inherent paradox in the work of Gottlob Frege and Georg Cantor (1845–1918) on
the fundamental notion of what a set ought to be. Russell was fond of the following non-technical
description of the paradox: Suppose that the barber of a certain town is a man who (lives in that
town) and shaves all men in town who do not shave themselves. Does the barber shave himself?
If the answer is “yes,” then the barber does not shave himself, so the answer is “no.” If the
answer is “no,” then it is false that the barber does not shave himself, so the answer is “yes” the
barber does shave himself. Although this project will not develop Cantor’s ideas, nor Russell’s
purported solution to this paradox, the project does oﬀer a brief excerpt from the introduction of
Principia Mathematica, where the authors state that mathematical logic “is framed with a view
to the perfectly precise expression, in its symbols, of mathematical propositions: to secure such
expression, and to secure it in the simplest and most convenient notation possible ... ” [24, p. 1].
Further material from Principia Mathematica for an introductory discrete mathematics course can
be found in the Loci: Convergence article “An Introduction to Symbolic Logic,” published on-line
in this series of projects. While reading the work of Russell and Whitehead, compare their notation
to that of their predecessors Frege and Boole.
Russell was a proliﬁc writer, contributing to the ﬁelds of education, history, religion, and political
theory, not to mention philosophy and logic [15]. In 1950 he received the Nobel Prize in Literature
“in recognition of his varied and signiﬁcant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals
and freedom of thought,” to quote the Nobel Foundation. He was an advocate of social reform, an
anti-war activist, and later in life an anti-nuclear activist. His anti-war protests in England resulted
in his dismissal from Trinity College in 1916, and a ﬁve-month imprisonment in 1918. Furthermore,
in response to public protest, his appointment at the City College of New York was terminated in
1940. Let’s read from the monumental Principia Mathematica [24, p. 6–8]:
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
The fundamental functions of propositions. ...
[T]here are four special cases which are of fundamental importance, since all the aggregations of
subordinate propositions into one complex proposition which occur in the sequel are formed out of them
step by step.
7
17They are (1) The Contradictory Function, (2) the Logical Sum or Disjunctive Function, (3) the
Logical Product, or Conjunctive Function, (4) the Implicative Function. ...
The Contradictory Function with argument p, where p is any proposition, is the proposition which
is the contradictory of p, that is, the proposition asserting that p is not true. This is denoted by ∼ p.
Thus, ∼ p ... means the negation of the proposition p. It will also be referred to as the proposition
not-p. ...
The Logical Sum is a proposition with two arguments p and q, and is the proposition asserting p or
q disjunctively, that is, asserting that at least one of the two p and q is true. This is denoted p ∨ q. ...
Accordingly p ∨ q means that at least p or q is true, not excluding the case in which both are true.
The Logical Product is a propositional function with two arguments p and q, and is the proposition
asserting p and q conjunctively, that is, asserting that both p and q are true. This is denoted by p.q ...
. Accordingly p.q means that both p and q are true. ...
The Implicative Function is a propositional function with two arguments p and q, and is the propo-
sition that either not-p or q is true, that is, it is the proposition ∼ p∨q. Thus, if p is true, ∼ p is false,
and accordingly the only alternative left by the proposition ∼ p∨q is that q is true. In other words if p
and ∼ p∨q are both true, then q is true. In this sense the proposition ∼ p∨q will be quoted as stating
that p implies q. The idea contained in this propositional function is so important that it requires a
symbolism which with direct simplicity represents the proposition ... . The symbol employed for “p
implies q”, i.e. for “∼ p ∨ q” is “p ⊃ q.” This symbol may also be read “if p, then q.” ...
Truth-values. The “truth-value” of a proposition is truth if it is true, and falsehood if it is false8. It
will be observed that the truth-values of p ∨ q, p.q, p ⊃ q, ∼ p, ... depend only upon those of p and q
... .
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
In part I of Principia Mathematica, the theme of deduction is studied in detail with this notion
expressed collectively as “the principles by which conclusions are inferred from premisses” [24, p.
90]. A crucial notion in this study is the implicative function stated above. Later in part I, Russell
and Whitehead write [24, p. 94]:
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Deﬁnition of Implication. When a proposition q follows from a proposition p, so that if p is true, q
must also be true, we say that p implies q. The idea of implication, in the form in which we require it,
can be deﬁned. ... The essential property that we require of implication is this: “What is implied by a
true proposition is true.” It is in virtue of this property that implication yields proofs. But this property
by no means determines whether anything, and if so what, is implied by a false proposition. What it
does determine is that if p implies q, then it cannot be the case that p is true and q is false, ... .
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Exercise 6.1. In the notation of Principia Mathematica, the symbols p, q, r, s, etc. denote
“elementary propositions,” which we shall interpret as simple statements that are either true or
false. For this exercise, let p, q, r, and s denote the following.
p: “The geological formation is a mountain.”
q: “The geological formation is a valley.”
8This phrase is due to Frege. (Footnote actually in Principia Mathematica.)
18r: “The geological formation is rich in minerals.”
s: “The geological formation is rich in vegetation.”
Write each of the following in the notation of Principia Mathematica, using ∼, ·, ∨. Be sure to
justify your answer. Consider “or” as being inclusive.
(a) The geological formation is either a mountain or a valley.
(b) The geological formation is either a mountain rich in minerals or a valley rich in minerals.
(c) The geological formation is either a mountain or a valley, with the additional condition that
the formation is rich in minerals.
(d) The geological formation is a mountain rich in vegetation, but not a mountain rich in minerals.
(e) The geological formation is a mountain, with the condition that it is rich in vegetation but
not rich in minerals.
(f) The geological formation is not a mountain.
(g) The geological formation is rich in minerals and rich in vegetation.
(h) The geological formation is not both rich in minerals and rich in vegetation.
(i) The geological formation is either not rich in minerals or not rich in vegetation.
(j) The geological formation is either rich in minerals or rich in vegetation, but not both.
(k) What law of symbolic logic can be concluded from parts (b) and (c) above? Justify your
answer. What law of symbolic logic can be concluded from parts (h) and (i)? Justify your
answer. Compare Russell and Whitehead’s notation with that of Boole.
(ℓ) What law of symbolic logic can be concluded from parts (d) and (e)? Justify your answer.
Compare Russell and Whitehead’s notation to that of Boole.
(m) Do you feel that Russell and Whitehead have found the logic for “perfectly precise expression,
in its symbols, of mathematical propositions: to secure such expression, and to secure it in
the simplest and most convenient notation possible”? Explain.
Exercise 6.2. In a written paragraph, examine the intellectual progress towards an understanding
of the truth of an implication from the following quotes of Philo, Frege, and Russell-Whitehead:
I. A valid hypothetical proposition is “that which does not begin with a truth and end with a
falsehood” [25, II. 110].
II. “I introduce the function of two arguments ξ
ζ
by stipulating that its value shall be the False if
the True be taken as ζ-argument and any object other than the True be taken as ξ-argument,
and that in all other cases, the value of the function shall be the True” [9, p. 51].
III. “[I]f p implies q, then it cannot be the case that p is true and q is false ...” [24, p. 94].
19How would ξ
ζ
be written in the notation of Principia Mathematica? Be sure to identify the symbol
from Principia Mathematica that plays the role of the condition-stroke. Justify your answer in terms
of the truth-values of the respective symbols from the works of Frege and Russell-Whitehead. What
would a “hypothetical proposition” be called in the language of Principia Mathematica?
Exercise 6.3. Write the major premise from Chrysippus’s ﬁrst rule of inference “If the ﬁrst, then
the second” entirely in the notation of Principia Mathematica. Be sure to identify two elementary
propositions p and q in your response and state their meaning.
Exercise 6.4. Reread the example of Chrysippus’s second rule of inference. Write “If it is day, then
it is light” entirely in the notation of Principia Mathematica. Be sure to identify two elementary
propositions p and q in this case, and state their meaning. Now, using the same choice for p and
q, write “If it is not light, then it is not day” entirely in the notation of Principia Mathematica.
Compare this to Frege’s approach outlined in Exercise 5.6.
Exercise 6.5. (a) Reread the example of Chrysippus’s ﬁfth rule and compare this to the implica-
tive function of Russell and Whitehead. Using the “inclusive or,” rewrite “Either it is day or
it is night” in the notation of Principia Mathematica. State the meaning of any elementary
propositions in your response. Using the same propositions, write “It is not night” in the
notation of Principia Mathematica. Write “Either it is day or it is night” as an equivalent
“if-then” statement so that the minor premise “It is not night” results in the same conclusion
as Chrysippus’s ﬁfth rule of inference.
(b) Can every “inclusive or” statement be written as an “if-then” statement? Justify your answer.
Can every “if-then” statement be written as an equivalent “inclusive or” statement? Justify
your answer.
Exercise 6.6. (a) Rewrite the major premise from the example of Chrysippus’s third rule: “It
is not the case both that it is day and it is night” in the notation of Principia Mathematica.
Begin with two elementary propositions denoting “It is day” and “It is night.” Rewrite the
major premise as an “inclusive or” statement using a rule of logic discovered in Exercise 6.1.
Find an implication (“if-then” statement) that is logically equivalent to the major premise.
(b) Can the negation of every “and” statement be written as an implication? Justify your answer.
Conversely, can every implication be written as the negation of an “and” statement? Justify
your answer in this case.
Exercise 6.7. In the fourth rule of inference, Chrysippus states “Either the ﬁrst or the second;
but the ﬁrst; therefore not the second,” which employs the “exclusive or.” Write the “exclusive or”
in terms of the Russell-Whitehead symbols ∼, ·, ∨. Be sure to explain your answer.
7 Wittgenstein Constructs Schemata
In Principia Mathematica Russell and Whitehead state that the truth-values of the fundamental
functions of propositions, i.e., “p and q,” “p or q,” “p implies q,” and “not q,” depend only upon
those of the elementary propositions p and q. Exactly how is the truth value of a compound
statement determined from its more elementary pieces? The algebraic notation of Boole, involving
×, +, −, does not entirely agree with the logical meaning of “and,” “or,” “not.” The condition
20stroke of Frege, although brilliant in its encapsulated meaning, is diﬃcult to manipulate. How
should the rules for calculation in symbolic logic be expressed?
Let’s now turn to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), considered by some as the
greatest philosopher of the twentieth century [4]. The Austrian-born scholar contributed to the
ﬁelds of logic, philosophy, and the study of language, while at times he worked modestly as a school
teacher, gardener, and architect, not to mention his service in the Austro-Hungarian army during
World War I. Upon the advise of Frege, the young Wittgenstein began to study logic with Russell
at Trinity College in 1911. While Russell initially wrote of Wittgenstein as “an unknown German
... obstinate ... but I think not stupid,” the British scholar soon came to think very highly of
Wittgenstein, particularly in the realm of logicism [4].
Wittgenstein’s ﬁrst publication Logische-philosophische Abhandlung [30], translated as Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus [31] [32], introduced a simple and unifying principle for evaluating the truth-
possibilities of symbolic statements in logic. As with his predecessors, he resolves complicated
statements into elementary propositions that are either true or false. For example, “the geological
formation is a mountain” could represent an elementary proposition. These propositions are then
combined into “states of aﬀairs” (Sachverhalten in the original German) using connectives like
“and,” “or,” and “not.” Wittgenstein speaks of symbolic logic as a “picture of reality,” much like
musical notation is a “picture” of music. Moreover, he introduces schemata (tables9) for displaying
all truth-possibilities of these pictures, allowing an easy overview of the conditions under which
a “picture” would be true and when it would be false. The Tractatus was highly inﬂuential, and
became a topic of discussion in the Vienna Circle of scholars. The text is organized around seven
main statements, numbered consecutively. Sub-numbering is then used to modify these statements
in turn. For example, statement 1.1 modiﬁes statement 1, while 1.11 modiﬁes 1.1, etc. The
Tractatus begins with the broad and ambitious ﬁrst statement “1. The world is all that is the
case,” and quickly limits its scope to propositions that “restrict reality to two alternatives: yes and
no.”
Initial publication of Logische-philosophische Abhandlung was met with diﬃculty and included
rejections from Cambridge University Press as well as several German publishing houses [11, p. 436].
With the assistance of Bertrand Russell, however, the manuscript ﬁrst appeared in the German
periodical Annalen der Naturphilosophie (Annals of Natural Philosophy) in 1921. Let’s read a few
excerpts from a modern translation of the Tractatus [32].
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.
4.2 The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and
non-existence of states of aﬀairs.
4.002 ... Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.
4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but
nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only
establish that they are nonsensical.
9The inﬂuential American logician Charles S. Peirce (1839–1922) also developed a type of truth table for his
three-valued system of logic, based on statements having values 0, 1/2, and 1 [18].
214.01 A proposition is a picture of reality. ...
4.011 At ﬁrst sight a proposition—one set out on the printed page, for example—does not seem to be
a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But no more does musical notation at ﬁrst
sight seem to be a picture of music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of
our speech.
And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what they
represent.
4.023 A proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no.
4.024 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.
4.06 A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.
4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural
sciences).
4.121 ... Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it.
4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of
aﬀairs.
4.24 ... I indicate them [elementary propositions] by the letters p, q, r.
4.25 If an elementary proposition is true, the state of aﬀairs exists: If an elementary proposition is
false, the state of aﬀairs does not exist.
4.26 ... The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of
them are true and which are false.
4.31 We can represent truth-possibilities by schemata of the following kind (“T” means “true,” “F”
means “false;” the rows of T’s and F’s under the row of elementary propositions symbolize their
truth-possibilities in a way that can easily be understood):
p q r
T T T
F T T
T F T
T T F
F F T
F T F
T F F
F F F
,
p q
T T
F T
T F
F F
,
p
T
F
.
4.442 For example, the following is a propositional sign10:
10The entry in the third row and third column is left blank, although ﬁlled in later to be “false.”
22p q
T T T
F T T
T F
F F T
If the order of the truth-possibilities in a schema is ﬁxed once and for all by a combinatory rule,
then the last column by itself will be an expression of the truth-conditions. If we now write this
column as a row, the propositional sign will become
“(TT-T)(p,q)”
or more explicitly
“(TTFT)(p,q).”
4.51 Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions: then I can simply ask what propositions I
can construct out of them. And there I have all propositions.
5 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
5.101 The truth-functions of a given number of elementary propositions can always be set out in a
schema of the following kind:
. . .
(TTTF)(p,q) In words: p or q. (p ∨ q)
(FFTT)(p,q) ” ” Not q. (∼ q)
(FTFT)(p,q) ” ” Not p. (∼ p)
. . .
(TFFF)(p,q) ” ” q and p. (q.p)
I will give the name truth-grounds of a proposition to those truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments
that make it true.
5.12 In particular, the truth of a proposition “p” follows from the truth of another proposition “q” if
the truth-grounds of the latter [q] are [among] the truth-grounds of the former [p].
5.121 The truth-grounds of the one are contained in those of the other: p follows from q.
5.122 If p follows from q, the sense of “p” is contained in the sense of “q.”
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Exercise 7.1. Wittgenstein’s simple yet profound contribution to symbolic logic is the use of
schemata (tables) to easily display all the truth-possibilities of a statement or proposition. Letting
p and q denote elementary propositions, ﬁll in the last column for “p or q” and “p and q” in each
of the following tables. Use the “inclusive or.”
23p q p ∨ q
T T
F T
T F
F F
p q p.q
T T
F T
T F
F F
Explain your solution and compare your work to statement 5.101 in the Tractatus.
Exercise 7.2. Wittgenstein introduces the term truth-grounds of a proposition to indicate the
“truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that make it true.” What are the truth-grounds of p∨q?
of q.p? Justify your answer.
Exercise 7.3. Recall that in Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead state “The Implicative
Function is a propositional function with two arguments p and q, and is the proposition that either
not-p or q is true, that is, it is the proposition ∼ p ∨ q.”
(a) Find the truth-grounds of the proposition ∼ p ∨ q.
(b) Find the truth-grounds of the proposition ∼ q ∨ p.
(c) Wittgenstein’s “deﬁnition” of the implicative function, q implies p, is “In particular, the truth
of a proposition “p” follows from the truth of another proposition “q” if the truth-grounds of
the latter [q] are [among] the truth-grounds of the former [p].” What diﬃculties arise when
attempting to construct the truth-grounds of “q implies p” from Wittgenstein’s deﬁnition?
To what extent does Wittgenstein’s deﬁnition of an implication (an “if-then” statement) rely
on Russell and Whitehead’s deﬁnition?
Exercise 7.4. For elementary proposition p, q, and r, determine the truth-grounds of the com-
pound propositions below. To organize your work, you may wish to ﬁrst construct the Wittgenstein
schemata for these statements. Consider “or” as inclusive.
(a) ∼ (p.q)
(b) (p.r) ∨ (q.r)
(c) (∼ p) ∨ (∼ q)
(d) (p ∨ q).r
Which of the above compound propositions are logically equivalent, i.e., have the same truth-
grounds? Compare your answer to the laws of symbolic logic discovered in Exercise 6.1.
Exercise 7.5. Discover your own law of symbolic logic not discussed in Exercise 7.4. You may
wish to study Exercise 6.1 for further laws not in Exercise 7.4, or simply ﬁnd a new law. Be sure
to justify your claims.
248 Post Develops Truth Tables
Independently of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Emil Post (1897–1954) developed a highly eﬃcient method
to represent the truth values of compound statements involving the connectives “and,” “or,” “not,”
and “if-then.” He dubbed these schematic representations “truth tables,” a term which is in current
use today.
Emil was born in Poland on February 11, 1897, and emigrated with his parents to New York in
1904. He received his undergraduate degree from the City College of New York, where he would later
return as a faculty member. While a graduate student at Columbia University, Post became keenly
familiar with the work of Russell and Whitehead, and participated in a seminar devoted to the study
of Principia Mathematica [20, p. xi–xii]. The notion of a “truth table” along with a clear rendition
of the table for “p implies q” appear in his doctoral dissertation “Introduction to a General Theory
of Elementary Propositions” [19], published in 1921, the same year as Wittgenstein’s “Logische-
philosophische Abhandlung.” Post begins his thesis with the “elementary propositions” of Russell
and Whitehead, namely the atomic propositions that are either true of false. He quickly develops
truth tables, and addresses several other issues, including multi-valued logic and a standard or
canonical form for statements in mathematical logic [20, p. xiii]. The former had also been studied
by Charles Peirce (1839–1922), while standard forms in logic are quite useful in computer science.
Additionally, he contributed to the ﬁelds of analysis (calculus), abstract algebra and computer
science, while his work in logic anticipated several pioneering results that would limit the scope
of Principia Mathematica, which was initially written to reduce the study of mathematics to the
study of logic.
Sadly, Emil suﬀered from manic depression, a condition which during his life time was treated
by electro-convulsive shock. His death from a sudden heart attack occurred in a mental institution
shortly after one of these treatments [20, p. xii]. Let’s read a brief excerpt from Post’s thesis [19],
and notice his rendering of the truth table for “p implies q.” Here and below p and q are elementary
propositions, assuming the value of “true” or “false.”
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
INTRODUCTION TO A GENERAL THEORY OF ELEMENTARY
PROPOSITIONS.
By Emil L. Post.
INTRODUCTION.
In the general theory of logic built up by Whitehead and Russell [22] to furnish a basis for all
mathematics there is a certain subtheory ... this subtheory uses ... but one kind of entity which the
authors have chosen to call elementary propositions. ...
2. Truth-Table Development—Let us denote the truth-value of any proposition p by + if it
is true and by − if it is false. This meaning of + and − is convenient to bear in mind as a guide
to thought, ... . Then if we attach these two primitive truth-tables to ∼ and ∨ we have a means of
calculating the truth-values of ∼ p and p ∨ q from those of their arguments.
25p ∼ p
+ −
− +
p, q p ∨ q
+ + +
+ − +
− + +
− − −
... It will simplify the exposition to introduce ...
p ⊃ q . = . ∼ p ∨ q
read “p implies q,” ... having the table
p, q p ⊃ q
+ + +
+ − −
− + +
− − +
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Exercise 8.1. Letting p and q denote elementary propositions, use the notation of Emil Post to
ﬁll in the right-hand column of each of the following truth tables: Consider “or” as inclusive.
p, q p.q
+ +
+ −
− +
− −
p, q ∼ (p.q)
+ +
+ −
− +
− −
p, q ∼ p ∼ q (∼ p) ∨ (∼ q)
+ +
+ −
− +
− −
Which compound propositions above are logically equivalent, i.e., have the same truth tables?
Why? Compare your answer with Exercise 7.4.
Exercise 8.2. Let p and q denote elementary propositions. From the work of Russell and White-
head, explain why p ⊃ q and ∼ p ∨ q are deﬁned to be logically equivalent, which Post uses above.
Construct the truth table for ∼ p ∨ q and compare this to the table for p ⊃ q given by Post.
Exercise 8.3. Construct the Post truth table for q ⊃ p for elementary propositions p and q.
Compare this table to Wittgenstein’s description that “p follows from q,” i.e. q ⊃ p, when the
truth-grounds of q are contained in the truth-grounds of p. You may wish to re-read Exercise 7.3.
Exercise 8.4. (a) Write “If it is day, then it is light” entirely in the notation of Principia Math-
ematica. Be sure to identify two elementary propositions p and q, and state their meaning.
(b) Now, using the same choice for p and q, write “If it is not light, then it is not day” entirely
in the notation of Principia Mathematica.
(c) Using the notation of Emil Post, construct the truth tables for the symbolic statements in
(a) and (b), and compare their ﬁnal columns. Based on the truth values in these tables, what
can be concluded about an implication and what Frege calls its contraposition?
26Exercise 8.5. Letting p denote the elementary proposition “It is day,” and q denote “It is night,”
write the compound statement “It is not the case both that it is day and it is night” in the notation
of Principia Mathematica. Construct the schema or truth table for this compound statement as
well. Find an implication (“if-then” statement) involving p and q that has an identical schema or
truth table, and justify your answer. Hint: Reread Chrysippus’s third rule of inference.
Exercise 8.6. Can an “inclusive or” statement always be rewritten as an equivalent “if-then”
statement? Justify your answer using appropriate schemata or truth tables for these two types of
statements. Hint: Reread Chrysippus’s ﬁfth rule of inference.
Exercise 8.7. Can an “exclusive or” statement always be rewritten as an equivalent “if-then”
statement? Justify your answer using appropriate schemata or truth tables for these two types of
statements.
Exercise 8.8. Rewrite the implication “If the roof leaks, then the house will not sell” as an
equivalent
(a) “inclusive or” statement;
(b) negation of an “and” statement;
(c) “if-then” statement beginning with “If the house will sell, ... .”
Justify your answer in each case.
Exercise 8.9. Rewrite the implication “If a warrior is born at the rising of the Dog Star, then the
warrior will not die at sea” as an equivalent
(a) “inclusive or” statement;
(b) negation of an “and” statement;
(c) “if-then” statement beginning with “If a warrior will die at sea, ... .”
Justify your answer in each case.
Exercise 8.10. Let’s compare the ﬁrst and third rules of inference from Chrysippus, consider-
ing them as argument forms comprising of three parts, a major premise, a minor premise and a
conclusion.
Rule I
Major premise: If the ﬁrst, then the second.
Minor premise: The ﬁrst is true.
Conclusion: Therefore, the second is true.
Rule III
Major premise: Not both the ﬁrst and the second.
Minor premise: The ﬁrst is true.
Conclusion: Therefore, the second is not true.
In the true-false world of propositions, is rule (I) equivalent to rule (III), meaning can whatever be
concluded from rule (I) also be concluded from rule (III) and vice versa? Let’s investigate this in
the following questions.
27(a) Let A and B denote propositions. Rewrite “If A, then B” as a logically equivalent negated
“and” statement.
(b) Using the negated “and” statement from part (a) and the minor premise from rule (I), namely
“The ﬁrst (A) is true,” what conclusion can be drawn from rule (III)? Does this conclusion
match that from rule (I)?
(c) Rewrite “Not both A and B” as an equivalent “if-then” statement.
(d) Using the “if-then” statement from part (c) and the minor premise from rule (III), namely
“The ﬁrst (A) is true,” what conclusion can be reached using rule (I)? Does this conclusion
match that from rule (III)?
(e) Can any conclusion reached via rule (III) also be reached via rule (I)? Explain.
(f) Can any conclusion reached via rule (I) also be reached via rule (III)? Explain.
Exercise 8.11. Let’s compare the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth rules of inference from Chrysippus, considering
them as argument forms as in Exercise (8.10).
Rule I
Major premise: If the ﬁrst, then the second.
Minor premise: The ﬁrst is true.
Conclusion: Therefore, the second is true.
Rule V
Major premise: Either the ﬁrst or the second (inclusive “or”).
Minor premise: The ﬁrst is not true.
Conclusion: Therefore, the second is true.
(a) Let A and B denote propositions. Rewrite “If A, then B” as a logically equivalent (inclusive)
“or” statement.
(b) Using the “or” statement from part (a) and the minor premise from rule (I), namely “The
ﬁrst (A) is true,” what conclusion can be drawn from rule (V)? Does this conclusion match
that from rule (I)?
(c) Rewrite “Either A or B” (inclusive “or”) as an equivalent “if-then” statement.
(d) Using the “if-then” statement from part (c) and the minor premise from rule (V), namely
“The ﬁrst (A) is not true,” what conclusion can be reached using rule (I)? Does this conclusion
match that from rule (V)?
(e) Can any conclusion reached via rule (V) also be reached via rule (I)? Explain.
(f) Can any conclusion reached via rule (I) also be reached via rule (V)? Explain.
Exercise 8.12. Write the major premise, minor premise and conclusion for Chrysippus’s ﬁrst and
second rules of inference. Following the examples in Exercises (8.10) and (8.11), explain why rule
(I) is logically equivalent to rule (II) as argument forms, i.e., show that any conclusion that can be
reached from rule (I) can also be reached via rule (II), and vice versa.
28Exercise 8.13. Returning to Aristotle’s work on logic, consider the statements
(I) If C occurs, then B occurs; and if B occurs, then A occurs.
(II) If C occurs, then A occurs.
Is statement (I) logically equivalent to statement (II)? Identify elementary propositions for each
and support your answer with appropriate schemata or truth tables.
Exercise 8.14. Is the concept of an “if-then” statement inherent in the use of language? Did logic
evolve to gain insight into the use of language? Cite relevant passages from the works of Aristotle,
Chrysippus, Boole, Frege, Russell-Whitehead, Wittgenstein or Post to support your claims.
Exercise 8.15. Is the concept of an “if-then” statement inherent in logic? Did the use of “if-
then” statements evolve to foster an understanding of logic? Cite relevant passages from the works
of Aristotle, Chrysippus, Boole, Frege, Russell-Whitehead, Wittgenstein or Post to support your
claims.
References
[1] Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, McKeon, R. (editor), Random House, New York,
1941.
[2] Aristotle, On Interpretation, in [1].
[3] Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in [1].
[4] Biletzki, A., Matar, A., “Ludwig Wittgenstein,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://
plato.stanford.edu.
[5] Boole, G., An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Walton and Maberly, London, 1854.
[6] Boole, G., An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1958.
[7] Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Hicks, R. D. (translator), Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965.
[8] Frege, G., Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: Begriﬀschriftlich abgeleitet, (photographic reproduc-
tion) Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1962.
[9] Frege, G., The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System, Furth, M. (translator),
University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1964.
[10] Gillispie, C.C., Holmes, F.L., (editors) Dictionary of Scientiﬁc Biography, Charles Scribner’s
Sons, New York, 1970.
[11] Grattan-Guinness, I., The Search for Mathematical Roots, 1870–1940, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2000.
[12] Gould, J. B., “Chrysippus: On the Criteria for the Truth of a Conditional Proposition,”
Phronesis, 12 (1967), 152–161.
29[13] Gould, J. B., The Philosophy of Chrysippus, State University of New York Press, Albany, New
York, 1970.
[14] Irvine, A. D., “Alfred North Whitehead,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://
plato.stanford.edu.
[15] Irvine, A. D., “Bertrand Russell,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://
plato.stanford.edu.
[16] Katz, V., A History of Mathematics: An Introduction, second ed., Addison Wesley, New York,
1998.
[17] Long, A. A., Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, England, 1987.
[18] Peirce, C.S., “On an Improvement in Boole’s Calculus of Logic,” Collected Papers of Charles
Sanders Peirce, Volume III: Exact Logic, C. Harshorne and P. Weiss (editors), Oxford Univer-
sity Press, London, 1967.
[19] Post, E. L., “Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions,” American Journal
of Mathematics, 43 (1921), 163–185.
[20] Post, E. L., Solvability, Provability, Deﬁnability: The Collected Works of Emil L. Post, Davis,
M. (editor), Birkh¨ auser, Boston, 1994.
[21] Russell, B., The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England,
1903.
[22] Russell, B., Whitehead, A.N., Principia Mathematica, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, England, 1910 (Vol. 1), 1912 (Vol. 2), 1913 (Vol. 3).
[23] Russell, B., A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, second ed., Allen and Unwin,
London, 1937.
[24] Russell, B., Whitehead, A. N., Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, England, 1997.
[25] Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism Bury, R. G. (translator), Harvard University Press,
Cambridge Massachusetts, 1967.
[26] Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, Bury, R. G. (translator), Harvard University Press,
Cambridge Massachusetts, 1967.
[27] Sfard, A. Thinking as Communicating: Human Development, The Growth of Discourse, and
Mathematizing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 2008.
[28] Smith, R., “Aristotle’s Logic,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://
plato.stanford.edu.
[29] Whitehead, A.N. A Treatise on Universal Algebra, with Applications, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, England, 1898.
30[30] Wittgenstein, L., “Logische-philosophische Abhandlung,” Annalen der Naturphilosophie, 14
(1921), 198–262.
[31] Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ramsey, F., Ogden, C.K. (translators),
Kegan Paul, London, 1922.
[32] Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Pears, D.F., McGuinness, B.F. (translators),
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
31Notes to the Instructor
This project is designed for an introductory course in discrete or ﬁnite mathematics that covers
elementary symbolic logic. Topics include propositional logic, truth tables, and the truth table of
a logical implication. Particular emphasis is placed on the logic of deduction as expressed today
in an “if-then” statement. An examination of various rules of inference throughout history reveals
a commonality of deductive thought, encapsulated today in the schemata of Ludwig Wittgenstein
and truth tables of Emil Post. The instructor may wish to lead class discussion on certain excerpts
from the original sources, and assign certain problems as out-of-class exercises. Be sure to draw
comparisons from one historical source to another, and follow the progress to what today appears
rather abruptly in most textbooks on discrete mathematics, namely the truth-table for an “if-then”
statement. Covered in its entirety, this curricular module may take up to ﬁve weeks, although there
are shorter paths through the material.
The project oﬀers excerpts from several sources, and not all sections need be covered in detail.
The most important selections are those from the ancient Greek philosopher Chrysippus and the
modern writers Russell and Whitehead. Chrysippus states verbally several rules of inference that
are commonplace in modern discrete mathematics textbooks, while the symbolic logic needed to
show their equivalence is essentially that of Russell-Whitehead. The organizing principle (leitmotif)
of the project is a discussion of the possible equivalence of Chrysippus’s verbal rules of deduction.
Each historical source in the module introduces its own signs and symbols for logical thought, and
the exercises examine how each new source contributes to the leitmotif. Using the tabular format
for truth values developed in the ﬁnal Wittgenstein and Post sources, a deﬁnitive analysis of the
equivalence of Chrysippus’s argument forms appears in Exercises (8.10), (8.11), and (8.12).
An abbreviated version of the project, requiring about three weeks, could begin with a study of
Chrysippus’s writings, a brief look at the symbolic work of Boole, a comparison of Frege’s condition
stroke with Philonian implication (Exercise 5.9), followed by a study of the symbolic logic of
Russell-Whitehead. A look at the modern truth table of an implication from Post oﬀers a unifying
conclusion to the project. Instructors may question the inclusion of Frege’s concept-script, especially
since this almost never appears in modern discrete mathematics textbooks. Frege’s condition stroke
oﬀers a stepping stone from Philo’s verbal statement about the truth of an implication to Russell
and Whitehead’s deﬁnition of an implication in terms of the inclusive “or” construction. Also,
four of Chrysippus’s rules can be written directly in terms of Frege’s condition stroke with minor
variations on negating the stroke or its arguments, which oﬀers insight into the equivalence of these
rules. In the language of Sfard [27], four discursive rules from ancient Greece can be replaced with
one discursive rule studied by Frege.
Although there are numerous exercises, not all need to be assigned. Diﬀerent exercises could
be assigned in diﬀerent oﬀerings of the course. Furthermore, as an in-class activity, the students
could work through several exercises together with the instructor. Other exercises could be added
at the conclusion of the project, such as comparing the truth tables or Frege’s concept-script for:
1. Compare p ⊃ (q ⊃ r) with (p ⊃ q) ⊃ r.
2. Compare p ⊃ (q ⊃ r) with (p.q) ⊃ r.
Above p, q, r are elementary propositions, and using the notation of Principia Mathematica [24],
p.q denotes “p and q,” p ∨ q denotes “p or q,” and p ⊃ q denotes “p implies q.” Many modern
textbooks write p.q as p ∧ q and p ⊃ q as p → q. The main goal of the project, however, is to
gain an appreciation of symbolic logic by witnessing the various attempts and historical progress
32at reducing statements to a useful symbolic form. Material on quantiﬁed logic can be found in
Guram Bezhanishvili and Wesley Fussner’s Loci: Convergence project “An Introduction to Sym-
bolic Logic,” published on-line in this series. For further material on Boolean algebras, see the
projects of Janet Barnett, “Origins of Boolean Algebra in the Logic of Classes,” “Boolean Algebra
as an Abstract Structure,” and “Applications of Boolean Algebra,” also published in this Loci:
Convergence series. For more information about coding information with 0s and 1s for computer
science, see Inna Pivkina’s Loci: Convergence article “Discovery of Huﬀman Codes.”
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